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Abstract
In response to a weight of evidence that patients are frequently harmed as a result of their care, there have been 
concerted efforts to make healthcare safer, with health systems across the globe investing significant resources 
in policies and programmes designed to reduce adverse events. Yet, despite extensive efforts, improvements in 
safety have proved difficult to sustain and spread, with studies confirming there has been no measurable, systems-
level improvement in the overall rates of preventable harm. Here, we highlight the limitations of the thinking 
which underpins current efforts to make healthcare systems safer and point to new and emerging approaches to 
understanding and addressing patient safety in complex,  dynamic health systems. 
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Try Again. Fail Again. Fail Better[1]
It has been recognised since antiquity that medical practice 
brings the possibility for both patient benefit as well as the 
potential for adverse clinical outcomes.1 This problematic is 
reflected in the guiding principle, primum non nocere (first do 
no harm) which remains a touchstone of contemporary codes 
of professional ethics. Nevertheless, history is replete with 
examples of where misguided but well-intentioned medical 
interventions have generated more harm than good[2]. The 
true scale of patient harm in health systems remained latent 
and under-recognised, and was not well known (even by the 
medical, nursing and allied professions) until comparatively 
recently.
Dating back to the early 1990s, successive international 
research studies that have assessed the extent of adverse 
events have accumulated evidence to suggest that around one 
in 10 patients experience some type of health-related harm 
while receiving inpatient care.2 Similar rates appear to hold 
in other health settings.3 The burgeoning field of patient 
safety research has highlighted failures of both commission 
(eg, medication errors) and of omission (eg, the failure to 
provide recommended care).4-7 In response to this mounting 
weight of evidence, there have been concerted efforts to make 
healthcare safer, with health systems across the globe investing 
significant resources in a bewildering array of policies and 
research programmes designed to reduce the burden of 
patient harm.8,9 As with many other aspects of health system 
reform, the medical profession has been a key influence in 
shaping research and policy in relation to patient harm, 
first by rejecting, then by gradually accepting, and finally by 
embracing the patient safety agenda.10 
There have undoubtedly been gains in making care safer, for 
example, through decreased catheter-related blood stream 
infections,11 lower mortality and morbidity attributed to the 
use of checklists in operating theatres,12 and the widespread 
adoption of Medical Emergency Teams and Rapid Response 
Systems to deal with deteriorating patients.13 Yet despite 
extensive efforts by many committed and well-intentioned 
policy-makers, managers, clinicians, researchers and patient 
groups, it is disconcerting that improvements in safety have 
been confined to a few celebrated examples or niche areas 
such as these. Where there have been solutions advanced, 
they have proved difficult to sustain and spread, with recent 
studies confirming there has been little or no measurable 
improvement in the overall rates of preventable harm at the 
systems level.2 Indeed, amid growing recognition that most 
patient safety problems are not amenable to simple solutions, 
it is apparent that the original optimism of the patient safety 
movement has given way to hard bitten realism.2,14
System Heal Thyself
Perhaps we have not been sufficiently sophisticated in 
specifying solutions to the problem of ameliorating harm. 
The system is complex and the problem is a wicked one.15 
Linear, uni-dimensional solutions—let’s run a hand hygiene 
campaign, let’s issue more policy, let’s regulate more 
extensively, let’s mandate root cause analysis in all cases of 
severe harm—applied to care settings, have fallen short of 
expectations for them.16 That being the case, the question 
becomes, what models, studies or concepts lay better 
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foundations for improvements in patient safety? 
Current approaches have deep historical and institutional 
antecedents that have been affirmed over decades, and 
are woven into the mindsets of those involved in health 
services research, healthcare policy and professional practice. 
Traditionally, the dominant mode of thinking about patient 
safety was predicated on the assumption of individual 
culpability, with errors and adverse events mainly attributed 
to incompetence, negligence and individual personality 
deficits such as carelessness, forgetfulness or recklessness. 
Based on this logic, individual clinicians, so called ‘bad apples,’ 
were blamed and held personally accountable for any errors 
made. Even so, in practice the medical profession largely 
failed historically to address wrongdoing and failures against 
professional regulatory procedures focused on identifying 
and rooting out ‘bad apple’ miscreants. Famous cases such 
as those in which the GP Dr Harold Shipman, working in 
the English NHS, systematically murdered his patients, and 
instances of large-scale inquiries into extensive harm,17,18 
highlight this. 
In order to tackle things differently, since around the turn of 
the millennium, stimulated amongst other factors by cases 
such as these, patient safety has increasingly been viewed as a 
systems issue whereby errors and adverse events are thought 
to arise mainly from dysfunctions in the wider systems of 
care rather than as the consequences of personal fallibility.19 
A new “safe systems orthodoxy” gradually emerged, in which 
errors and adverse events were attributed to aberrations 
in the “system.” In this framing, clinicians are not so much 
seen as culpable or reckless, but as interacting agents in 
problematic systems or cultures. Interventions were oriented 
towards designing working environments that anticipated 
and minimised the impact of human error, with a focus on 
reducing both ‘active failures,’ ie, mistakes and unsafe acts 
made by interacting health professionals working at the 
sharp end of care delivery, and addressing more upstream 
‘latent failures’ located in the wider environment (eg, 
problematic organisational cultures, poor team dynamics, 
time pressures or deficits in workload scheduling). This kind 
of early systems thinking was underpinned by a conviction 
that reorganising formal structures, streamlining systems of 
care, or purposively managing organisational cultures would 
deliver the desired improvements in patient safety.20 This 
systems approach spawned many interventions built on a 
multiplicity of conceptualisations of the problem, including 
root cause analysis, the swiss cheese model, lean techniques, 
checklists, and the like.
Fault Lines in Systems Thinking
But this systems approach, while an advance on earlier linear 
attempts to improve things, has not taken us sufficiently 
far. It has relied on what we think of as simplistic systems 
thinking. It is the version of systems theory that underpins 
many current efforts to make care safer, but has a number of 
serious limitations which may, in part, explain why progress 
has still been so painfully slow. First, this kind of systems 
thinking, which underpins the approach we now know as 
Safety-I, still assumes at its heart that adverse outcomes can be 
explained by linear cause-effect chains, as originally proposed 
by the Domino metaphor21 and embodied in the widespread 
use of patient safety frameworks and tools such as incident 
reporting and root cause analysis.19,22 Although it does bring 
into the safety arena a systems science perspective, this 
framing of errors and adverse events nevertheless sees that 
they have a definable cause which can be ‘found and fixed.’ It 
remains focused on locating the causes of failure, rooting out 
aberrations, and introducing interventions in an attempt to 
eliminate (or at least attenuate) their distal causes.
However, it is clear that the logic inherent in this approach 
no longer corresponds to the reality of care settings, if ever it 
did. The lack of success in improving patient safety over these 
last two decades may be due to the concepts and methods 
underpinning systems-oriented approaches not matching the 
profound complexity of modern healthcare settings. Care is 
delivered in intricate, fragmented, sometimes chaotic settings, 
in complex political, socio-cultural environments with a 
virtually infinite range of moving parts and interconnections. 
Healthcare is characterised by informalities, work-arounds, 
feedback loops, emergent behaviours, politics, nested 
networks, fractal properties, systems dynamics, and bottom-
up adaptiveness.23 These kinds of settings stubbornly resist the 
introduction of top-down, standardised policy, regulations or 
linear-style interventions.24,25 They may even induce serious 
deleterious consequences if there are substantial mismatches 
between the putative solutions and their intended target.26 
Another, related limitation of simplistic systems thinking is 
that the ‘system’ to be fixed is primarily conceived as the local 
‘micro-system,’ comprising local clinical and team behaviours 
responsive to upper-echelon prescriptions, rather than more 
broad-based factors, such as profession-wide social structures 
and cultural norms.27,28 Indeed, a fatal flaw in the Safety-I 
approach is that it is heavily infused with thinking which has 
been described as work-as-imagined.4 Work-as-imagined is 
what those working at the blunt end of the health system (eg, 
policy makers, regulators, planners, directors and researchers) 
believe or think should happen at the sharp end of care 
delivery when they design improvement strategies or attempt 
to influence or nudge the behaviours of those working at the 
sharp end. Much of this is predicated on encouraging and 
mandating adherence to a multiplicity of rules, regulations 
and external performance metrics and standards. Work-as-
done on the other hand is what people do on the front-lines 
of care to get the job accomplished in complex settings which 
are always very different from the way those remote from 
the front lines imagine them to be. Sometimes clinicians do 
provide care that corresponds to the ways those who envision 
and prescribe it at the blunt end imagine it to be, but this is 
rare. This is because people working at the sharp end do so 
in resource-constrained, challenging and culturally unique 
circumstances, and for the most part they accomplish their 
tasks by employing informalities, localised patchwork-quilt 
solutions, and work-arounds.29,30 In short, clinicians on the 
front lines of care flex and adjust their practices to fit with, 
and map to, the local contexts, demands, contingencies and 
cultural characteristics, rather than in response to top-down 
regulation, policies and standard operating procedures. 
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Despite the on-the-ground variation, complexities, and local 
adjustments in clinical care, things go right far more often 
than they go wrong. This is a key insight of those advocating 
Safety-II.4,14,28,31,32 This argues that a feature of clinical work 
that has been paid too little attention is that it succeeds far 
more often than it fails. As a consequence of this insight and 
argument, in such complex adaptive systems, we need to 
better understand how work is actually accomplished across 
different healthcare settings and thereby seek to become more 
accomplished at matching work-as-imagined and work-as-
done. This would mean we need to get better at designing 
work-as-imagined policies, regulations and standards so 
that they much closer align to, and reflect an enhanced 
understanding of, how work is actually done.33 It would also 
mean we need a system in which those at the sharp end of care 
delivery have a better appreciation of what is being sought by 
those doing work-as-imagined, and an enhanced appreciation 
of their own organisation cultures and systems.20 Yet in health 
systems research, culture and culture change are often poorly 
theorised and based on the overly simplistic assumption that 
cultures are malleable and can be readily manipulated and 
managed to beneficial effect.34,35 We should be cautious, too, 
in drawing parallels between healthcare and other industries, 
such as aviation, as it is problematic to import ideas wholesale 
from very different cultural contexts and expect them to be 
taken up unproblematically.36
In short, most systems improvement strategies to date have 
been based on imagining work rather than how it is done 
in practice.4 That is to say, those at the apex of the hierarchy 
have determined, funded or prescribed policies or initiatives 
to be embraced by those on the front lines of clinical care 
without adequate understanding of the complex intricacies 
and nuances inherent in the delivery of modern healthcare.
New Approaches and Future Directions for Research
As we have seen, progress in making care safer for patients 
has been sufficiently slow such that the momentum is seen 
to have stalled. The rates of harm appear to have flatlined at 
10%. This necessarily calls into question the dominant ways 
in which patient safety has been framed and addressed. Albert 
Einstein is credited with the familiar aphorism, “Insanity 
is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting 
different results.” If we want to achieve different results then 
we need to be less reverential towards the orthodox paradigm, 
get beyond simplistic system thinking, expand our research 
horizons, and advance new and better ways for understanding 
and intervening in patient safety. One approach is to take the 
thinking originating from resilience engineering, the Safety-
II approaches identified above, and begin to focus more 
clearly on how things typically go right. This is a radically 
wide-ranging view of the system. It argues that the same 
behaviours produce good care as produce poor care, and 
seeks to understand the complex health system in more 
comprehensive ways. This extended view of safety argues 
that attention must be placed on the conditions under which 
people succeed rather than fail, instead of looking myopically 
at why things go wrong. 
The Safety-II perspective recognises that both failures 
and successes have their origin in performance variability 
(at both the individual and systemic levels), and that it is 
equally mistaken to attribute successes to careful planning 
and diligence as it is to attribute failures to individual 
incompetence or error. An important practical implication 
flows from this argument. We cannot appreciate a system 
and its performance by looking solely or predominantly at 
harm. We must direct attention to the whole system, and the 
conditions under which it operates, if we are to make gains 
in understanding. We will not apprehend the system in all its 
complexity by looking only at abnormalities when healthcare 
delivery fails. 
Complementing this approach, we point to other recent work 
drawing on complexity science applied to healthcare.32,37-41 
This calls into view the dynamic nature of the system, 
the relationships that deliver care, and its interactional 
characteristics. We also point to advances and evolving 
research from across the social sciences such as recent 
studies on the sociology of patient safety,10 including new 
dramaturgical perspectives on the organisational governance 
of patient safety,42 increasingly persuasive research on the 
potential for patient and relatives to contribute towards 
safer care,43 and the use of (behavioural) economic levers 
and incentives to motivate organisations and individuals to 
provide safer care for patients.8 
Taken together, these new horizons work with the complex 
dynamics of healthcare instead of assuming that things will 
change by instrumental means, by operationalising top-down 
linear solutions. They also show, much more profoundly than 
previously, how superficial conceptualisations of systems will 
not do. We need to form deep knowledge of the nature of the 
healthcare complex adaptive system, its resilient expressions 
and capacities, and mobilise a wider range of stakeholders 
including patients, to the patient safety enterprise. 
That is the new horizon, and we see glimpses of evidence, 
reported here, that we are shifting toward it. There are 
grounds to believe, at least for the optimists among us, as we 
have argued above, that it will not be yet another false dawn. 
But only time will tell whether, and the extent to which, we 
can make more tangible progress in our journey, reaching 
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Endnotes
[1] Becket S. Worstward Ho. New York, NY: Grove Press Inc; 1983. 
[2] Classic examples include the use of mercury and arsenic as medicines in the 
18th Century and Thalidomide in the 1960s.
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